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HANDBOOK OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH. Edited by 
Gerhard Loewenberg, 1 Samuel C. Patterson,z and Malcolm E. 
Jewell.3 Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1985. 
Pp. 810. $32.50. 
Philip P. Frickey4 
Handbook of Legislative Research is a new collection of review 
essays assessing the state of political science research concerning 
legislatures. Many law professors will find it a handy compendium 
of information. 
The editors, all respected political scientists, label their collec-
tion an "inventory of research." Part I, dealing with legislators and 
constituencies, addresses legislative recruitment and careers, there-
lationship between electoral outcomes and responsiveness to con-
stituents, and a more general overview of the role and 
responsiveness of legislators. Part II, which concerns legislative or-
ganization and leadership, contains articles about the roles of par-
ties and factions in legislatures, the committee assignment process, 
legislative leadership, legislative staffs, and legislative organization 
and rules. Part III, on legislative processes, examines standing 
committees; legislative voting; the legislature's relationship with 
and oversight of the executive branch; the supposed "iron triangle" 
of legislative committees, administrative agencies, and interest 
groups; legislative shaping of policies and budgets; and the utility of 
abstract models of the political process growing out of public choice 
theory. Finally, part IV presents some historical and comparative 
perspectives. 
For law professors, the value of this book might not be readily 
apparent. In fact, however, public law theorists should find the 
work of substantial importance. Legal realism properly counsels 
the legal scholar to craft public law theory in light of realistic as-
sumptions about the political process. In recent times legal scholars 
have not been hesitatant to undertake this burden. Public law 
scholarship fairly abounds with writings proposing some adjust-
ment of public law in light of empirical realities. Consider a few 
examples. A legal scholar who believes that administrative agencies 
tend to be captured by the interests they are supposed to regulate 
I. Professor of Political Science and Dean of the College of Liberal Arts, University of 
Iowa. 
2. Roy J. Carver Distinguished Professor of Political Science, University of Iowa. 
3. Professor of Political Science, University of Kentucky. 
4. Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. 
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might propose that courts enforce a nondelegation doctrine.s A 
legal scholar who concludes that interest groups dominate legisla-
tive decisionmaking might counsel courts to strike down statutes 
that embody deals that promote the private interests of powerful 
groups rather than public values.6 Another legal scholar of a simi-
lar empirical but different jurisprudential bent might see the judge's 
role as an agent of the legislature who must sanction-and perhaps 
even promote-whatever deals among groups are ratified by the leg-
islature in the form of a statute. 1 
Legal scholars should not instantly modify public law theory in 
light of the latest nuances in economic modeling or empirical find-
ings. Yet public law theory cannot be divorced from an under-
standing, partial and tentative though it may be, of the institutional 
qualities of legislatures and administrative agencies. In addition, we 
all make countless generalizations about the political process in our 
legal scholarship and teaching. These frequently appear to be based 
more on seat-of-the-pants guesswork or ideology than on careful re-
flection upon the understandings of our compatriots across the cam-
pus in the departments of political science, sociology, economics, 
and so on. The publication of Handbook of Legislative Research 
thus provides the law professor with easy access to important 
information. s 
I cannot speak directly to the needs of scholars other than law 
professors. Many political scientists who teach courses in constitu-
tional law, judicial behavior, and legal philosophy may well have a 
contemporary appreciation of legislative processes, interest group 
politics, and so on. I would think, however, that Handbook of Leg-
islative Research would still be a convenient and handy resource for 
them, if they consider its contents significant for their courses. As a 
consumer of an undergraduate constitutional law course in the early 
1970's, I remember studying game theory and a variety of other 
5. See, e.g., Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. 
REV. 1667, 1684-87, 1693·97 (1975) (concluding that reviving the nondelegation doctrine is 
unlikely to improve administrative law substantially). 
6. See Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985). 
7. See Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4, 14-17, 
45-48 (1984). 
8. The book will be valuable to law students as well. It is no secret that law students 
who lack a social science background sometimes find constitutional law, administrative law, 
legislation, and other public law courses extraordinarily frustrating. In addition, their fellow 
law students who have that background often have difficulty relating social science to public 
law theory. William N. Eskridge and I are preparing materials for a course in legislation that 
attack these problems. Unlike Handbook of Legislative Studies, our materials are introduc-
tory and suggestive rather than comprehensive. The student who wishes a richer overview of 
particular topics now has a ready resource in that book, which is admittedly too dense for 
quick consumption by novices. 
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topics in the context of Supreme Court decisionmaking. I do not 
recall spending much time on subjects I now consider more central 
to constitutional law: for example, the comparative competence of 
courts, legislatures, and agencies to handle some aspect or another 
of public policy; strategies of judicial intervention into politics; and 
devices that might promote a lawmaking partnership between 
courts and legislatures based on greater cooperation and less antag-
onism. If these topics are stressed in political science courses in the 
1980's, Handbook of Legislative Research should enhance the effort; 
if they are not, the publication of this book removes any excuse 
based on the difficulty of ascertaining the state of the art in legisla-
tive research. 
The reader of Handbook of Legislative Research will find one 
dominant message between its covers-a pessimistic view of the 
ability of contemporary political science to explain legislative 
processes and to predict legislative outcomes. Part of the problem 
seems to be the nonreplicative nature of the methodology of some 
studies. Case studies are one common method of political science 
inquiry, and though useful they usually do not lend themselves to 
the creation of meaningful theories. Overall, Handbook of Legisla-
tive Research reinforces the generalization that political science has 
created "good descriptive information about how certain legisla-
tures work, [but only] a very limited set of theoretical propositions 
that can help to explain these workings. "9 
Consider a question of major concern both to political scien-
tists and to public law theorists: the degree to which interest groups 
influence political outcomes. One searches in vain in Handbook of 
Legislative Research for concrete conclusions on this subject. As 
two social scientists recently stated, "[T]he realm of organized in-
terest politics is so vast--encompassing so many different kinds of 
organizations and so many different avenues of influence-that it is 
possible to locate an example to illustrate virtually any reasonable 
generalization one might put forward."10 Any public law theory 
based in part upon even plausible empirical generalizations about 
interest group politics is always subject to challenge by theorists 
who find different empirical generalizations more plausible. Politi-
cal science provides no easy way to resolve these disputes. 
Competing with political science for the attention of the law 
professor is public choice theory. By applying the methodology and 
9. Ferejohn & Fiorina, Purposive Models of Legislative Behavior, 65 AM. EcoN. REv. 
407 (1975). 
10. K. SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOC-
RACY xiii (1986). 
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assumptions of economies to political science-that is, by formulat-
ing abstract models for predicting leg;slative outcomes based on the 
assumption that people are egoistic, rational, utility maximizerstt_ 
public choice theorists have developed sophisticated and intriguing 
models of the legislative process. These models readily generate 
predictions~f unfortunately doubtful accuracy. Indeed, the essay 
in Handbook of Legislative Research by William H. Panning 
presents a largely critical overview of "formal models" and suggests 
that, at least in their most abstract forms, they are fundamentally 
misguided. 
I would have liked to have seen more discussion of public 
choice theory in Handbook of Legislative Research. The Panning 
essay is an extremely thoughtful and useful overview of formal 
models and their problems, but it may embody too much of the 
traditional political science perspective.t2 Moreover, with few ex-
ceptions, the other essays focus on traditional political science stud-
ies, with little attention paid to studies using public choice 
methodology. 
In some instances this omission seems particularly unfortunate. 
For example, the essay concerning voting behavior by legislators-a 
subject about which public choice theory ought to have a good deal 
to say-notes "studies of voting behavior cast in the framework of 
axiomatic theory," states that a "synthesis of the axiomatic research 
and the more behaviorally oriented research on legislative voting 
would no doubt be informative," but nonetheless concludes that 
such a discussion "is beyond the scope of this article." In context, it 
is unclear whether the author reached this conclusion on her own or 
had marching orders from the editors. In either event, I think 
II. See, e.g., D. MuELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE (1979). Illustratively, consider Becker, A 
Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups/or Political Influence, 98 Q.J. EcoN. 371, 371-
72 (1983): 
The economic approach to political behavior assumes that actual political 
choices are determined by the efforts of individuals and groups to further their own 
interests .... 
Individuals belong to particular groups-defined by occupation, industry, in-
come, geography, age, and other characteristics-that are assumed to use political 
influence to enhance the well-being of their members. Competition among these 
pressure groups for political influence determines the equilibrium structure of taxes, 
subsidies, and other political favors. 
Political influence is not simply fixed by the political process, but can be ex-
panded by expenditures of time and money on campaign contributions, political 
advertising, and in other ways that exert political pressure. Political equilibrium 
has the property that all groups maximize their incomes by spending their optimal 
amount on political pressure, given the productivity of their expenditures, and the 
behavior of other groups. 
12. I cannot pretend to pocess the expertise to assess this potential criticism fully. Pan-
ning's essay comports, by and large, with my own perceptions of the limited utility of abstract 
modeling. 
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Handbook on Legislative Research is made weaker by the omission. 
Stereotypic criticisms based on "the ad hoc empiricism and casual 
theorizing of conventional political science"t3 are fostered by such 
refusals to broaden the inquiry. 
Some social scientists are attempting to build bridges between 
public choice theory and traditional political science.t4 Panning's 
essay in Handbook of Legislative Research praises these develop-
ments. In the main, however, the other authors of this compedium 
miss the opportunity to suggest methods of integrating the two dis-
ciplines in future studies of the topics of their overview essays. 
Although comprehensive only within the world of political sci-
ence, Handbook of Legislative Research is a publication of signifi-
cance to the legal academic community. If consulted, it should 
promote a public law theory less fettered by inadequate, or stereo-
typic, or ideologically loaded perceptions of the political process. 
Of course, even it is dated upon publication. For example, it was 
prepared before the release, in early 1986, of the first comprehensive 
study of interest groups in the American political system in over 
twenty years.ts Handbook of Legislative Research in no way 
reduces the obligation of public law theorists to remain current 
about the understandings of social science, but it certainly makes 
that task easier. 
Now, if reputable scholars would only create a Handbook of 
Public Choice Theory, to give us an overview of abstract modeling of 
political processes, and then publish a third volume collecting ef-
forts to integrate the viewpoint of the first two handbooks, public 
law theorists would find it convenient to be trinitarian rather than 
unitarian in their social science samplings. Of course, even if that 
millenium arrives we would face a much more difficult endeavor: 
figuring out what to make (and what not to make) of that 
information.t6 
13. Brennan & Buchanan, Voter Choice: Evaluating Political Alternatives, 28 AM. 
BEHAV. SCI. 185, 200 (1984). 
14. See, e.g., Shepsle, Prospects for Formal Models of Legislatures, 10 LEG. STUD. Q. 5 
(1985). 
15. SeeK. SCHLOZMAN & 1. TIERNEY, supra note 10. 
16. For a more comprehensive discussion of theories of legislative behavior and their 
relationship to public law, see Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice 65 TEX. 
L. REV.- (1986) (forthcoming). 
